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A corroborative approach to verification
and validation of human–robot teams
Matt Webster1, David Western2, Dejanira Araiza-Illan2, Clare Dixon1,
Kerstin Eder2,3, Michael Fisher1 and Anthony G Pipe3,4
Abstract
We present an approach for the verification and validation (V&V) of robot assistants in the context of human–robot inter-
actions, to demonstrate their trustworthiness through corroborative evidence of their safety and functional correctness.
Key challenges include the complex and unpredictable nature of the real world in which assistant and service robots oper-
ate, the limitations on available V&V techniques when used individually, and the consequent lack of confidence in the
V&V results. Our approach, called corroborative V&V, addresses these challenges by combining several different V&V
techniques; in this paper we use formal verification (model checking), simulation-based testing, and user validation in
experiments with a real robot. This combination of approaches allows V&Vof the human–robot interaction task at differ-
ent levels of modeling detail and thoroughness of exploration, thus overcoming the individual limitations of each tech-
nique. We demonstrate our approach through a handover task, the most critical part of a complex cooperative
manufacturing scenario, for which we propose safety and liveness requirements to verify and validate. Should the result-
ing V&Vevidence present discrepancies, an iterative process between the different V&V techniques takes place until cor-
roboration between the V&V techniques is gained from refining and improving the assets (i.e., system and requirement
models) to represent the human–robot interaction task in a more truthful manner. Therefore, corroborative V&Vaffords a
systematic approach to ‘‘meta-V&V,’’ in which different V&V techniques can be used to corroborate and check one
another, increasing the level of certainty in the results of V&V.
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1. Introduction
Robotic assistants that interact with people in an informal,
unstructured, and complex manner are increasingly being
considered for industrial and domestic domains. In manu-
facturing, the drive toward more flexible production, qual-
ity, and consistency in the production, and the reduction of
tiring and dangerous tasks requires that humans work near
robots, or even teach and physically interact with them as
co-workers.
A way to enhance robots, to allow their safe and trust-
worthy participation in human–robot interactions (HRI), is
the incorporation of safety and fault recovery mechanisms
at all levels, from low-level mechanical systems and basic
controllers to higher-level decision-making systems (Alami
et al., 2006; Pipe et al., 2011). For example, restricting
motion when near humans has been applied as a low-level
safety solution (Pedrocchi et al., 2013). However, to allow
robot assistants to transition from research laboratories and
very limited application scenarios (such as surveillance,
transport or entertainment) to the broader domestic and
industrial domains, they need to be demonstrably trust-
worthy (Eder et al., 2014). Collaborative robots will also
need to conform to recent standards, e.g., ISO 10218-
1:2011 (2011), ISO 13482:2014 (2014), and ISO/TS
15066:2016 (2016). Thus, HRI requires the development
of coherent and credible frameworks for V&V.
A major challenge in V&V of robot assistants is that no
single technique is adequate to cover the whole system in
practice. ‘‘Correct’’ functioning in an HRI scenario is likely
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to depend on precise physical details, as well as complex
high-level interactions. Individually, formal methods, such
as model checking and theorem proving, simulation-based
testing, or experiments in real-world scenarios, cannot
examine the entire state space of the interaction with realis-
tic detail. The advantages of these techniques—formal,
simulation, and experiments—in terms of coverability (i.e.,
the exploration of the state space, such as combinations of
human–robot actions or motion ranges) and realism can be
exploited when combining them.
Combining V&V techniques in the HRI domain yields
an additional benefit—trust in the correctness of V&V
results. When using a single V&V technique, this is hard
to achieve. System models used in formal methods or
simulation-based testing, and requirements models, are
subject to manual input errors, despite efforts in automating
translations between models and translations from code to
models. The use of complementary V&V techniques can
highlight discrepancies and help system developers gain
confidence in the resulting evidence about safety and live-
ness requirements.
1.1. Our contribution
Our contribution, presented in this paper, is twofold:
1. To propose an approach to the verification and valida-
tion of robots and autonomous systems that allows dif-
ferent V&V techniques to corroborate one another,
and where the outcomes from applying one technique
are used to improve the other techniques. This
approach, called corroborative V&V, provides a greater
degree of certainty in the V&V results than would be
found in using the V&V techniques individually.
2. To demonstrate the effectiveness of corroborative
V&V by applying it to the most critical part of a colla-
borative manufacturing HRI scenario, the robot-to-
human handover task.
In this paper, we combine formal methods, simulation-
based testing, and user validation through experiments with
a real robot, in the context of HRI. If the evidence agrees
when verifying and validating the same requirement
through the three techniques, we will be more confident in
the results. Otherwise, an iterative process is used to refine
and improve the truthfulness of the assets, the system, and
requirement models underpinning each technique. Hence,
corroborative V&V provides increased confidence in the
evidence, compared with using V&V techniques in isola-
tion. At the same time, by enabling V&V to span across
several levels of detail or abstraction, our approach pro-
vides a thorough exploration of the robot’s range of beha-
viors, thus overcoming limitations of individual V&V
techniques.
The proposed approach is exemplified through an
object handover task, the most critical component of a
cooperative manufacture scenario, for the BERT 2 robot
(Lenz et al., 2010). We formulated safety and liveness
requirements based on relevant standards. We then used
this case study to show that corroborative V&V can provide
a greater degree of confidence than when using V&V tech-
niques in isolation. The instantiation of our approach for
the case study comprises, as V&V techniques, probabilistic
model checking in PRISM (Kwiatkowska et al., 2011),
simulation-based testing in ROS (Open Source Robotics
Foundation, 2019) and Gazebo (Open Source Robotics
Foundation, 2014), and an experimental setup in the Bristol
Robotics Laboratory.
A formal model comprising probabilistic timed auto-
mata was constructed by hand, representing the HRI.
Probabilistic computation tree logic (PCTL)
(Kwiatkowska et al., 2011) properties were derived from
the requirements, to be verified against the formal model.
We developed a simulator in ROS–Gazebo, with the real
code for the robot and a simulated human co-worker. Tests
were derived from model-based and pseudorandom tech-
niques, as in our previous work (Araiza-Illan et al., 2015,
2016), to stimulate the HRI components toward checking
the satisfaction of the requirements. Automated checkers
implemented as assertion monitors, as described in our pre-
vious work (Araiza-Illan et al., 2015, 2016), were also
derived from the requirements and added to the simulator.
Applying the complementary V&V techniques exposed
discrepancies in the resulting evidence, allowing the assets
to be examined and refined. Iterating over this process led
to agreement between the three techniques, thus providing
greater confidence in the correctness of the resulting evi-
dence and the suitability of subsequent design
recommendations.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the
corroborative V&V approach, outlining the V&V tech-
niques, their corresponding assets to be developed from the
HRI system and its requirements, and their interactions to
gain confidence in the resulting evidence. We then intro-
duce the case study, the handover task, and the require-
ments to be verified in Section 3. Next, we present the
instantiation of the proposed corroborative V&V approach
for the case study in Section 4, including the development
of assets comprising the formal model, the simulator, and
the translations of the requirements into logical properties
and assertions. We present the V&V results for two of the
proposed requirements in Section 5, describing in detail the
encountered evidence discrepancies, with the consequent
asset refinement and improvement processes until a high
degree of corroboration between the V&V results is
reached. In Section 6, we then demonstrate V&V of the
remaining requirements using the three V&V techniques.
Section 7 discusses the findings and limitations in the
application of the corroborative V&V approach to our case
study. In Section 8, we compare our approach to others in
the literature, highlighting how corroborative V&V pro-
vides a novel V&V framework and complements existing
approaches. Finally, we offer conclusions and directions for
future work in Section 9.
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2. Corroborative V&V
As noted in the introduction, corroborative V&V provides
a thorough exploration of the robot’s range of behaviors
across different levels of abstraction, thus overcoming lim-
itations of individual V&V techniques. Our approach to
the V&V of human–robot teams is shown in Figure 1. We
propose the combined use of a number of techniques to
verify and validate robots in HRI tasks, which are shown in
ellipses. Each technique is underpinned by two assets: a
requirements model, shown in a rectangle, and a system
model, shown in an octagon. In this paper, we focus on the
use of three particular V&V techniques, but other meth-
odologies can be integrated into the corroborative V&V
process if required. This is discussed in more detail in
Section 7.1. We introduce the techniques, the assets, and
the corroborative V&V workflows, indicated by the arrows
in Figure 1, in the following subsections.
2.1. V&V techniques
Formal verification encapsulates a set of mathematical
techniques, which are used to prove properties about a for-
mal model of a system. Some of the most common formal
verification techniques are model checking (Clarke et al.,
1999) and theorem proving (Fitting, 1996). In this paper,
we use model checking, which lets us verify that formal
models (which represent the robot and its non-deterministic
environment) satisfy temporal logical properties (derived
from requirements) for every possible way in which the
models can be executed. As we examine every possible
execution of the formal model, we can demonstrate
whether or not the model satisfies the temporal logical
properties.
In ‘‘traditional’’ model checking, finite state machines
are modeled and explored exhaustively in order to deter-
mine whether some property holds (Clarke et al., 1999).
Properties are typically expressed as logical formulas writ-
ten in a logical language, e.g., linear-time temporal logic or
computation tree logic. The output of a model checker is
typically a Boolean value, true or false, indicating whether
the model satisfies a given property. Where the model does
not satisfy the property, an ‘‘error trace’’ or counterexample
is output, describing the sequence of states that led to the
violation of the property (Fisher, 2011). Probabilistic model
checking, explained further in Section 4.1, extends this
method to allow the computation of the probability that a
given property will be satisfied.
Simulation-based testing involves running a simulator
under different inputs (or tests), to observe the resulting
outputs and determine whether the simulated system
behaves as intended. Software and hardware components
can be modeled to achieve an appropriate compromise
between realism, modeling effort, and computational cost,
and real code can be run. Nonetheless, the exploration of a
system under test is not exhaustive. Systematic methodolo-
gies to explore the system under test, such as coverage-
driven verification (Araiza-Illan et al., 2015, 2016), should
be used to increase efficiency and effectiveness under com-
putational constraints. A coverage-driven verification test-
ing process needs testbench components, including a test
generator and a driver, to stimulate the system under test, a
coverage collector, to keep track of the V&V progress, and
a checker, which models the requirements and automates
the checking (Piziali, 2004).
Experiments are performed within a test rig to verify
and validate robots interacting in realistic environments
with respect to textual requirements. As experiments often
involve human volunteers, health and safety assessments,
and expensive equipment, the number of times that a par-
ticular scenario can be examined is often severely limited,
compared with simulation or formal verification. In this
paper, experiments are focused toward achieving clear evi-
dence on the principal requirements, as well as to ground
the corroborative V&V process in reality.
The diagonal axis in Figure 1 arranges the three tech-
niques based on how realistic and how coverable they are,
where coverability refers to how much of its asset a tech-
nique can analyze. Note that there is generally a trade-off
between realism and coverability. Formal verification (e.g.,
using a model checker) can exhaustively check the entire
state space of a formal model (Clarke et al., 1999), while
simulation-based testing only samples the state space of a
simulation model. However, a simulation model is able to
better account for physical details that are difficult to cap-
ture in a formal model, such as physical dynamics, and is
therefore able to more realistically model the actual system.
Physical experiments are even more realistic, but the num-
ber of experiments that can be performed will probably be
significantly lower than the number of simulations that can
be performed, since experiments are more heavily con-
strained by time and other resources. Additionally, physical
experiments can be adversely constrained by ethical or
safety concerns, which are not an issue in simulation-based
testing and formal verification.
Fig. 1. Framework for corroborative V&V.
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2.2. V&Vassets
In Figure 1, it is shown that requirements can be modeled
in a number of ways. Textual requirements are the written
requirements that describe the desired behavior of a robot
and can also include some assumptions about the human
user’s behavior and the environment in which the robot
operates (e.g., materials required to complete the task are
available at the start). Textual requirements are used in
experiments to determine whether the robot (i.e., the physi-
cal system) satisfies them. Textual requirements for robots
are typically based on the needs of the system’s users but
are increasingly based on legal or ethical frameworks speci-
fied by a regulatory or standards authority. For example,
ISO/TS 15066:2016 (2016) defines many safety require-
ments for collaborative robots. In practice, verifying a tex-
tual requirement in experiments may necessitate refinement
of the text with consideration of the actual scenario, to
avoid ambiguities.
Assertions are requirements of a system expressed in an
assertion specification language using the syntax of pro-
gramming languages such as C or Python (Foster et al.,
2004), or as assertion monitors, such as the ones implemen-
ted in Araiza-Illan et al. (2015, 2016) and Huang et al.
(2014a). Assertions are commonly formulated in a
precondition-implies-postcondition manner, and can be
implemented directly in the code under testing, or within the
simulation models. Tools are available to convert temporal
logical properties into monitors for runtime verification, as
in Havelund and Rosu (2002) and Huang et al. (2014a), the
latter for testing robots. The systems under verification are
stimulated to attempt to trigger the preconditions in the
assertions and consequently their respective postconditions.
The outcomes of these checks are interpreted to determine
whether the requirements are satisfied.
A software simulator, usually written in a high-level pro-
gramming language, contains models of the robot’s behavior
as well as its environment. In simulation-based testing, the
simulator program is executed a number of times (computa-
tion time allowing), to collect information from the assertion
checks and the simulation itself. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, a number of both open source and proprietary simu-
lation and development frameworks exists in robotics, such
as ROS, Player/Stage, Gazebo, V-REP, and Webots.
Logical properties are logical statements, each of which
captures one or more requirements of the system using
some formal logic. Different logics can be used for differ-
ent applications; e.g., if we want to capture requirements
relating to time, we might use linear temporal logic (Fisher,
2011). Alternatively, if we are interested in the probability
of the requirement being met, we might use PCTL.
Formal modeling tools specialize in supporting particular
types of formal model and temporal logic, such as PCTL
by PRISM (Kwiatkowska et al., 2011). Formal models are
discrete computational descriptions of high-level behaviors.
Finite state automata (Clarke et al., 1999) and probabilistic
timed automata (Parker, 2016) are two examples.
Figure 1 arranges the requirements models in order of
how expressive or precise they are. ‘‘Expressivity’’ here
indicates the breadth of realism that could be referred to in
the requirement model, while ‘‘precision’’ refers to how spe-
cific the expressions may be. A single requirement may be
implemented as assertions in many ways, e.g., according to
interpretations by different programmers. As assertions are
based on programming languages, whose semantics are
more well-defined than natural languages, we consider
assertions to be more precise than textual requirements.
Logical properties are, in turn, more precise than assertions
and textual requirements, as they have precise, mathemati-
cal definitions. Conversely, assertions can be more expres-
sive than logical properties, as they can capture aspects of
the system that are difficult to specify at higher levels of
abstraction (e.g., physical states that depend on modeled
dynamics). However, the assertions are less expressive than
the textual requirements: subjective requirements, such as
user satisfaction, are difficult to model in programming lan-
guages. It should also be noted that the more realistic levels
of the framework can support a broader set of requirements,
since they allow the monitoring of parameters or the analy-
sis of components that might not be available in more
abstract models.
Ideally, the assets mentioned before would be generated
during the development of the robot itself. For example,
textual requirements would be developed at the start of the
traditional product engineering life cycle and might be
based on standards and regulations, such as ISO 10218-
1:2011 (2011) for industrial robots. At the next stage in the
life cycle, the product would be designed. Simulation and
formal analysis are often used in the hardware and software
domains at the design stage in order to gain confidence in
the correctness of the design with respect to the specifica-
tions. Hence, formal models and simulators would be devel-
oped. This practice can be adopted for the design of robot
assistants, as demonstrated by Kirwan et al. (2013) for
autonomous navigation. Experiments would be performed
during implementation of the robot system in real-life HRI,
after designing the corresponding setup. If it is not possible
to develop all assets during the initial development of the
human–robot system—e.g., if the human–robot system has
already been developed—the approach can still be applied.
In this case, it is necessary to develop assets based on exist-
ing materials.
Re-examining equivalent requirements implemented at
different abstraction levels of the framework provides an
opportunity to refine individual assets to represent the HRI
more accurately and truthfully, making the framework
robust with respect to human error and providing a high
degree of confidence in the resulting evidence. When refin-
ing the assets, complexity needs to be carefully managed,
e.g., through abstraction. Re-modeling formal models and
simulators can result in a state space explosion and a sig-
nificant increase in time and memory (Clarke et al., 2012).
As explained previously, each level of our framework rep-
resents a different compromise between realism and the
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coverability of the state space. Any decisions affecting the
balance of this compromise should be made by those con-
ducting the V&V.
The bidirectional arrows between the different system
models in Figure 1, and between the different requirements
models, indicate that the development of any of these mod-
els may be informed by the equivalent model at another
level of abstraction. Such development may be carried out
manually or by using some of the techniques mentioned in
Section 8. Our framework allows for the incorporation of
such techniques to suit the application in question.
2.3. Workflows
Our approach leaves open the order in which the different
V&V techniques in Figure 1 should be used. Such deci-
sions should be made with consideration for the specific
HRI application in question. Furthermore, these decisions
will typically be made in a reactive manner, because
insights gained from any of the techniques can lead to
modifications in any of the system models or requirements
models, necessitating a further stage of V&V to increase
confidence in the results, possibly with a different
technique.
For example, we could start with a set of logical proper-
ties and a formal model of the robot system. Formal verifi-
cation would then be used to verify that the formal model
satisfies the logical properties. This process is indicated by
the arrows from ‘‘Logical Properties’’ and ‘‘Formal Model’’
to ‘‘Formal Verification’’ in Figure 1. The result of formal
verification is evidence that the formal model is correct
with respect to the logical properties. During this V&V, we
might discover that the formal model does not satisfy a par-
ticular property. If we trust this V&V result, modifications
to the formal model could be an appropriate way to explore
possible design modifications. The ‘‘Simulator’’ and ‘‘Test
Rig’’ would then need to be updated accordingly, as repre-
sented by the bi-directional dashed arrows between system
models in Figure 1. Alternatively, the property violation
may be due to an error in the model or in the logical prop-
erty (i.e., we have incorrectly formalized a requirement).
We may wish to revise the properties or formal model (or
both) manually if the fault lies there. This is indicated by
the arrows from ‘‘Formal Verification’’ back to ‘‘Logical
Properties’’ and ‘‘Formal Model.’’ Similarly, we might wish
to gain more confidence in the correctness of the formal
model and logical properties by employing one of the other
V&V techniques, before proceeding to modify the real sys-
tem and the other assets.
The same requirements, implemented as assertions,
could then be monitored during simulation-based testing,
providing more V&V evidence. This technique is indicated
by the arrows from ‘‘Simulator’’ and ‘‘Assertions’’ to
‘‘Simulation-based Testing.’’ During testing, we might find
requirement violations, as we did with formal verification,
and we would then have to decide a course of action: revis-
ing the relevant assets (e.g., the simulator or the assertions),
or proceeding to compare the results with experiments to
gain more confidence, if results were similar to formal veri-
fication. (The comparison between the outputs of the V&V
techniques is indicated by the bold arrows in Figure 1.)
Conversely, evidence generated by the simulation might
not align with evidence generated by the other V&V tech-
niques, resulting in a lack of corroboration. There are a
number of potential causes of such disagreements:
 System model inaccuracies. All the V&V techniques
use models of the real world. The models might have
been constructed erroneously or might be inconsistent
with the real world, or relative to one another.
 Requirement model inaccuracies. In our approach, the
real-world requirements of the system are converted
into textual requirements, assertions, and properties for
V&V. These requirements models might not have been
correctly formulated.
 Tool inaccuracies. It is possible that numerical approxi-
mations affect the V&V results. In addition, third-party
tools can contain bugs that are unknown.
We could now proceed to perform ‘‘Experiments.’’ As
before, we might find a problem with the textual require-
ments or the robot’s test rig during experimentation. At the
same time, the evidence from formal verification or
simulation-based testing can be compared against the
experiment results. We might also discover that one of the
requirements is satisfied during simulation-based testing or
formal verification but not during the experiments. In this
case, we might need to refine any of the other assets, as
explained before.
Careful comparisons must be made between the differ-
ent representations in order to discover the cause of the
conflicts. Such comparisons are indicated by the bi-
directional bold arrows between ‘‘Formal Verification’’ and
‘‘Simulation-based Testing,’’‘‘Simulation-based Testing’’
and ‘‘Experiments,’’ and ‘‘Formal Verification’’ and
‘‘Experiments,’’ respectively, in Figure 1.
3. The BERT handover task: A case study
Corroborative V&V can be used to provide a higher degree
of confidence in the V&V evidence than when using V&V
techniques in isolation. In this section, we present an (inten-
tionally) simple HRI case study to demonstrate this. The
corroborative V&V of a more complex case study would
have been difficult to fully explain within the bounds of this
paper. It was thought preferable to cover a simpler scenario
in a great amount of detail, rather than a more complex
HRI scenario in less detail. Nevertheless, corroborative
V&V might be applied to more complex scenarios than the
one presented here.
Despite its simplicity, our HRI case study concerns
robot-to-human handover, the most critical part in a
human–robot collaborative manufacturing task. The case
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study uses BERT 2, an upper-body humanoid robot
designed to facilitate research into complex human–robot
interactions, including verbal and non-verbal communica-
tion, such as gaze and physical gestures (Lenz et al., 2010)
(see Figure 2). BERT 2’s software architecture was origi-
nally developed using YARP (YARP, 2019). More recently,
this system has been wrapped with a ROS interface.
We verify an object handover to exemplify our
approach, in the context of a broader collaborative manu-
facture scenario where BERT 2 and a person work together
to assemble a table (Lenz et al., 2012). In the handover, the
first step is an activation signal from the human to the
robot. BERT 2 then picks up a nearby object and holds it
out to the human. The robot announces that it is ready to
handover. The human responds verbally to indicate ‘‘ready
to receive.’’ (For practical reasons, human-to-robot verbal
signals were relayed to the robot by pressing a key.) Then,
the human is expected to pull gently on the object while
looking at it. BERT 2 then calculates three binary sensor
conditions:
 Gaze. The human’s head position and orientation rela-
tive to the object are tracked using the Vicon motion-
tracking system for an approximate measure of whether
he or she is looking at the object.
 Pressure. Changes in the robot’s finger positions are
sensed to detect whether the human is applying pres-
sure to take the weight of the object.
 Location. The Vicon motion-tracking system is used
to determine whether the human’s hand is located on
the object.
The sensor conditions must be calculated within a time
threshold for BERT 2 to determine whether the human ‘‘is
ready.’’ The robot should release its grip on the object if all
three conditions are satisfied. Otherwise, the robot should
terminate the handover and not release the object. The
human may disengage and the robot can time out, which
would cancel the remainder of the handover task. The sen-
sors are not completely accurate and might sometimes give
incorrect readings.
3.1. System requirements
A safety requirement ensures that ‘‘nothing bad happens,’’
whereas a liveness requirement ensures that ‘‘something
good happens eventually’’ or inside a threshold of time, for
practical reasons (e.g., in simulation). The requirements for
any HRI task depend on its safety and functional context.
For example, in our case study the robot would need to
achieve a particular handover success rate threshold to keep
up with manufacturing throughput or avoid unacceptable
damage costs, as per the users’ requirements. We consid-
ered two different thresholds for our first functional require-
ment, based on estimates of acceptable productivity in two
different settings. The first threshold is considered for
deployed use in a hypothetical manufacturing environment.
Requirement 1a. At least 95% of handover attempts should
be completed successfully.
In a research and development environment, a lower
threshold may be considered satisfactory to provide proof-
of-concept, showing that the system works most of the time.
Requirement 1b. At least 60% of handover attempts should
be completed successfully.
The following requirements were chosen to illustrate
our approach, inspired by Grigore et al. (2011) and draw-
ing from standards ISO 10218-1:2011 (2011) for industrial
robots, ISO 13482:2014 (2014) for personal care robots,
and ISO/TS 15066:2016 (2016) for collaborative robots:
Requirement 2. If the human is not ready, the robot shall
not hand over the object.
Requirement 3. If the human is ready, the robot shall hand
over the object.
Requirement 4. The robot always reaches a decision within
a threshold of time.
Requirement 5. The robot shall always either time out,
decide to release the object, or decide not
to release the object.
Requirement 6. The robot shall not close its hand when the
human is too close.
Requirement 7. The robot shall start at restricted speed.
Requirement 8. If the robot is within 10 cm of the human,
the robot’s hand speed is less than 250
mm/s.
These requirements are ambiguous in terms of how they
are assessed over the available system information, reflect-
ing the generality of the standards and the shortfalls of
using natural language when first establishing require-
ments. To verify and validate them, we need to interpret
Fig. 2. BERT 2 in the handover task test rig. Video available at
multimedia Extension 1.
6 The International Journal of Robotics Research 00(0)
them in terms of available variables and system behaviors
according to the assets.
4. Corroborative V&Vof the case study
After establishing the system’s requirements, we developed
a plan for the application of corroborative V&V to the case
study. We chose to focus on a ‘‘typical use case’’ for the
handover task, in which the human has a working familiar-
ity with the robot and intends to complete the task success-
fully. Any of the requirements may be used as bases for
comparison between techniques used, provided that the
requirement may be modeled at all levels of abstraction.
We chose to focus on our principal functional requirements
(requirements 1a and 1b, concerning the handover success
rate) as a first basis for failure finding and to refine the
assets if necessary. The handover success rate could be
expected to be sensitive to a wide range of foreseen and
unforeseen events. As a scalar measure, it allows evidence
from the V&V techniques to be compared in a quantitative
manner, whereas comparisons of Boolean results might be
insensitive to important modeling discrepancies.
After focusing on requirements 1a and 1b, we proceed
to verify the remaining requirements (requirements 2–8),
identifying any further need to improve assets or the system
itself. The V&V of the full set of requirements provides a
more comprehensive evaluation of the system’s requirement
satisfaction, while facilitating the evaluation of the benefits
of combining individual V&V techniques to complement
one another.
As mentioned in Section 2.3, corroborative V&V will
be carried out in a reactive manner according to the result-
ing evidence. In terms of the order in which we applied the
V&V techniques, we chose to begin with a comparison of
formal verification and simulation-based testing for
requirements 1a and 1b, to acquire as much insight as pos-
sible into the system and our modeling assumptions before
committing resources to more expensive physical experi-
ments. The subsequent stages of V&V and asset modifica-
tion, explained in Section 5, were conducted with the aim
of achieving agreement on the handover success rate
(requirements 1a and 1b) that was corroborated by all three
V&V techniques.
To apply our approach to the BERT 2 handover scenario,
it was necessary to implement each element in Figure 1.
Appropriate tools for formal verification and simulation-
based testing were selected first. Requirements models were
then translated from the textual requirements in Section 3,
and system models were constructed to reflect the physical
system. We developed relevant assets for a chosen set of
tools, comprising the probabilistic model checker PRISM,
ROS–Gazebo and a coverage-driven verification testbench
for simulation-based testing, and experiment designs at the
Bristol Robotics Laboratory. We detail the development of
these components in the following subsections.
4.1. Formal verification
We chose PRISM, a probabilistic symbolic model checker
(Kwiatkowska et al., 2011), for the formal verification
component. In PRISM, probabilistic systems can be modeled
as discrete- and continuous-time Markov chains, Markov
decision processes, and probabilistic timed automata. In
PRISM models, transitions between states can be annotated
with probabilities. The models consist of a set of modules,
each representing a different process within the system
being modeled. Modules are executed concurrently. Each
module consists of a number of variables along with transi-
tion rules for updating those variables according to precon-
ditions. Communication between modules is made possible
by reading globally accessible variables and by synchroni-
zations between transitions in different modules. Execution
of a PRISM model starts from an initial state (of which there
can be many) and advances by application of transitions
whose preconditions have been satisfied. These transitions
then update the state of the model. This continues until a
fixed point is reached, when it is no longer possible to
update the state (Parker, 2016).
Properties to verify can be expressed in a probabilistic
logic such as PCTL (Baier and Katoen, 2008). Rather than
outputting a Boolean value, PRISM can be used to output a
probability that a given property holds for some sequence
of states, or path, through a model (Parker, 2016). PRISM
has been used to model and verify a range of probabilistic
systems, such as security protocols (Duflot et al., 2013),
biological systems (Konur and Gheorghe, 2015), robots
and multi-robot systems (Konur et al., 2012; Llarena and
Rosenblueth, 2012).
4.1.1. Formal model. The PRISM model of the handover
task consists of nine different modules: the human, the
human’s gaze, hand pressure, and location, the robot (rep-
resenting BERT 2), BERT 2’s gaze, pressure, and location
sensors, as well as a timekeeper module, which keeps track
of time elapsed in the model. Figure 3 shows how the dif-
ferent modules within the PRISM formal model communi-
cate. There are four modules that model the human’s
behavior: Human, which models the human’s decision-
making and communications with the robot; and gaze,
Fig. 3. Inter-module communication within the PRISM formal
model.
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pressure, and location, which model the human’s gaze,
hand pressure, and hand location. Four modules model the
BERT 2 robotic system: Robot, which models the robot’s
decision-making and communication with the human, and
gaze sensor, pressure sensor, and location sensor, which
model sensors that track the human’s gaze, hand pressure,
and hand location. The timekeeper module monitors all of
the other modules to measure time elapsed.
The model consists of around 300 lines of PRISM code
and is therefore too long to reproduce in this paper. We
could represent the PRISM modules as diagrammatic state
transition systems; however, owing to the large number of
states of each module, such diagrams are hard to read.
Therefore, for illustrative purposes, the robot, human, and
timekeeper modules are shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6,
respectively. Additionally, the full code for the PRISM
model is available online (Webster et al., 2018).
The PRISM code can be interpreted as follows. The first
line in the human module defines the start of the module.
The second line defines a module variable, ‘‘humanState,’’
which is an integer in the range 0 to 99. Its initial value is
set to ‘‘start,’’ which is the name of a constant integer set
outside the module:
const int start = 0;
Lines 3–9 are transition rules, which determine how the
state of the human module changes over time. For example,
the first rule (see line 3) says that if the human is in the
state called ‘‘start,’’ then the state is updated to
‘‘activatedRobot.’’ In other words, the first thing the human
does in this scenario is to activate the robot for the hand-
over task. The rule also contains a synchronization label,
‘‘activateRobot,’’ which means that this transition must
occur at the same time as all other transitions with the same
label. In this case, the only other module containing
this label is the timekeeper module (Figure 6), as the syn-
chronizations in this model are used primarily to keep track
of how much time has elapsed. Another feature of PRISM is
probabilistic non-determinism, which can be seen in lines
8–9 of the human module, in which the human may disen-
gage from the handover task with a probability set by
pDisengages or remain engaged with a probability set
by pStaysOnTask. These are modeled as two constant
double-precision floating point numbers:
const double pDisengages = 0;
const double pStaysOnTask = 1-pDisengages;
For our case study, the probability that the human
disengages (i.e., becomes bored or distracted) is set to zero
as we are examining the typical use case in which the
human is always focused on the task. Similarly, we assume
that the human’s gaze, hand pressure, and location are
always within acceptable bounds for the handover task, i.e.,
the probabilities that these are acceptable are each set to
1.0. In this model, we are primarily concerned with the
robot’s reliability, so we assume that the human is com-
pletely reliable and engaged with the task at hand. Note
that these probabilities could be set differently if, for
instance, we wanted to incorporate the human’s tiredness
level in the model, or if we wanted to specify that the
Fig. 4. The human module written in PRISM.
Fig. 5. The robot module written in PRISM.
Fig. 6. An excerpt from the timekeeper module written in PRISM.
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person’s interest in the task may waver, affecting gaze and
hand pressure and location.
Clearly, the human module only captures the tiny frag-
ment of human behavior that is relevant to the handover
sub-task. In more complex HRI scenarios, the human mod-
ule might have to be much more complex. Indeed, it is
extremely unlikely that a PRISM module will ever be able
to capture the full complexity and nuance of human beha-
vior. However, it is still desirable, and in fact necessary, for
V&V to model the human’s interactions with the robot,
even if the model is abstract and coarse-grained.
Real-world sensors do not work perfectly, and this is
reflected in the formal model. As a result, it is possible that
the handover task will not always complete successfully.
The gaze sensor reports that the human is looking at the
object only 95% of the time. The rest of the time the sensor
reports (incorrectly) that the human is not looking at the
object. When the gaze sensor reports correctly that the
human’s gaze is okay, the gaze sensor has reported a ‘‘true
positive.’’ When the gaze sensor incorrectly reports that the
human’s gaze is not okay, we call this a ‘‘false negative.’’
Similarly, the gaze sensor might correctly report that the
person is not looking at the object (a true negative, also
with probability 95%) or might incorrectly report that the
person is looking at the object (a false positive).
The part of the formal model that handles the gaze, pres-
sure, and location sensor states can be seen in lines 16–22
of Figure 5. Note that true positives and their correspond-
ing false negatives are mutually exclusive, and therefore
P(false negative)= 1 P(true positive). The same is also
true of true negatives and false positives:
const double pGazeTP = 0.95;
const double pGazeFN = 1-pGazeTP;
const double pGazeTN = 0.95;
const double pGazeFP = 1-pGazeTN;
The pressure and location sensors are given the same
probabilities of 95% for true positives or negatives and 5%
for false negatives or positives. With no experimental
results or hardware specifications to refer to, it was
assumed that sensors would be accurate ‘‘most of the time.’’
A reliability of 95% was therefore chosen as a first
estimate.
4.1.2. Logical properties. Logical properties, representing
requirements, were expressed in terms of PCTL. We use
the following PCTL symbols (Parker, 2016): :p meaning
that p is not true, p ^ q meaning that both p and q are true,
p _ q meaning that either (or both) of p or q is true, p q
meaning that if p is true then q is true, Fp meaning that
eventually p will be true, Gp meaning that p is always true
from now on, Xp meaning that p is true in the next state
and pUq meaning that p is true until q is true. P(q) denotes
the probability of q being true in the initial state.
For example, consider requirement 3: ‘‘Once the human
is ready, BERT 2 will hand over the object.’’ This require-
ment can be implemented as a temporal logical formula:
G (robot State=GPLOkF robotState= handoverSuccessful)
ð1Þ
which reads ‘‘it is always the case that if gaze, position, and
location are correct, then eventually the handover is suc-
cessful (i.e., the object is released to the human).’’ We can
then find the probability of this formula being true on any
given path through the state space. We do this by forming a
property in probabilistic computation tree logic (specifi-
cally, PCTL*), which can be analyzed using a probabilistic
model checker like PRISM:
P= ? G (robotState=GPLOkF robotState= handoverSuccessful)ð Þ ð2Þ
Using the operation P= ?(f ) tells the model checker that
we want to find out the probability of the formula f .
Another requirement, requirement 1a, is that the prob-
ability of completion of the handover task should be greater
than 95%. This can be rephrased as, ‘‘the success rate of the
handover task is at least 95%.’’ This can be formulated as a
property in PRISM as follows:
P F robot State= hand over Successfulð Þø 0:95 ð3Þ
This property states that the probability that the robot
will eventually release the object is at least 0.95, or 95%.
Note that the translation of textual requirements into
logical properties is not direct, since there might be differ-
ent interpretations, depending on the available variables,
probabilities, and so on. Hence, this translation process car-
ries the potential for misinterpretation. For example, in
properties (1) to (3), ‘‘hand over Successful’’ is used as a
synonym for ‘‘object handed over,’’ which might not be
correct in all cases (e.g., the human may drop the object
after release).
The full code for the PRISM models and properties used
in this paper can be found online (Webster et al., 2018).
4.2. Simulation-based testing
A simulator for the handover task was implemented in the
ROS framework for robot code development and the
Gazebo simulator. Among Gazebo’s features are support for
3D graphics rendering and various physics engines (includ-
ing ODE (Smith, 2019), used in this paper). Although now
available as a standalone Ubuntu Linux package, Gazebo
was originally developed as a ROS package and retains its
compatibility with ROS. A URDF (universal robot descrip-
tion format) file, used in ROS to describe the kinematic
structure of the robot, actuators, and sensors, can simply be
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extended to describe parameters used by the physics engine,
such as inertial properties and friction coefficients. This
compatibility allows the same control code to be used in
simulations and in the actual robot, providing consistency
between simulations, experiments, and deployed use. A
screenshot of the ROS/Gazebo simulation can be seen in
Figure 7.
For the simulator, additional ROS nodes were con-
structed in Python to simulate BERT 2’s sensor systems
and embedded actuation controllers. The pre-existing
URDF file describing BERT 2 was extended as described
previously for use in Gazebo. The simulated human beha-
vior was controlled by a ROS node written in Python, driv-
ing a simplified physical model of the head and hand.
A testbench was incorporated into the simulator. The
testbench comprised a test generator, a driver, a checker,
and a coverage collector. Exploring meaningful and inter-
esting sequences of behaviors from the robot and its envi-
ronment in an HRI task is challenging. For this reason, we
stimulate the robot’s code in the simulation indirectly by
stimulating its environment (e.g., the person’s behavior)
instead, and we use a combination of model-based and
pseudorandom test generation. Also, to alleviate the com-
plexity of generating and timing different types of system
inputs, the test generator is based on a two-tiered approach
(Araiza-Illan et al., 2016), where an abstract test is gener-
ated first and then concretized by instantiating low-level
parameters. The high-level actions of the human in the
simulator include sending signals to the robot or setting
abstract parameters for gaze, location, and pressure. Low-
level parameters include the robot’s initial pose and the
poses and force vectors applied by the human during the
interaction. For example, we computed an abstract test of
high-level actions for the human, by exploring the model
in UPPAAL (Uppsala Universitet and Aalborg University,
2015), so that the robot was activated (sending a signal to
activate the robot and waiting for the robot to present the
object), the gaze, pressure and location sensor readings
were correct (set gaze, pressure, and location to mean
‘‘ready’’), and the robot released the object. This allowed
requirement 3, ‘‘If the human is ready, BERT 2 should
hand over the object,’’ to be tested.
The driver distributed the test components in the simula-
tor. A self-checker—i.e., automated assertion monitors—
was added according to the requirements, described in more
detail in the following subsection. Finally, a coverage col-
lector gathered statistics on the triggering of the assertion
monitors. The simulator code is available online (GitHub,
2019).
4.2.1. Assertion monitors. For requirements checking,
assertion monitors were implemented as state machines in
Python, allowing sequences of events to be captured. If the
precondition of an assertion is satisfied, the machine transi-
tions to check the relevant postconditions, to determine
whether the assertion holds or not. Otherwise, the postcon-
ditions are never checked.
For example, requirements 1a and 1b and requirement 3
were both initially monitored as the following sequence:
if (sensors_OK)
wait_for(robot_decision)
assert(robot_released_object)
Note that, as with the logical properties, there may be
different ways to implement an assertion for the same tex-
tual requirement, and there is scope for misinterpretation.
The results of the assertion checks, if triggered, are col-
lected and a conclusion about the satisfaction of the veri-
fied requirements can be drawn at the end of simulation.
The number of times each assertion monitor has been trig-
gered in a set of tests can be used as a measure of the cov-
erage achieved by that test set.
4.3. Experiments
BERT 2 can be verified experimentally with respect to the
textual requirements using a custom facility at the Bristol
Robotics Laboratory, as shown in Figure 2. When seeking
to verify the probabilistic properties of a system, the experi-
ments should ideally provide an unbiased sampling repre-
sentative of the system’s deployed environment. However,
some phenomena might be difficult to reproduce naturally
in experiments, owing to their rarity, safety considerations,
or other practical limitations. Consequently, experiment-
based estimates of their likelihood might be inaccurate, as
might estimates of dependent properties, such as the overall
success rate of the task.
In the case of the handover task, we cannot confidently
seek an overall success rate that accounts for the full possi-
ble range of conditions relating to hardware, software, the
environment, and the human (including mood, anatomy, and
Fig. 7. Screenshot of the simulated handover task. The human
head and hand are represented in orange. The object to be handed
over is shown in blue. Video available at multimedia Extension 2.
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level of understanding of the task). Human factors are par-
ticularly challenging to test in an unbiased way. This prob-
lem can be ameliorated by acknowledging the constraints of
the experiments or proactively constraining them to achieve
a more reliable characterization of a subset of the system’s
state space. The constraints become a part of the resulting
V&V evidence. Thus, the experiments deliver an estimate of
‘‘success rate within some set of constraints,’’ instead of an
estimate of ‘‘overall success rate.’’ More affordable or cover-
able V&V tools, such as simulation or formal modeling,
may be employed to gain confidence beyond this con-
strained experiment. Additionally, more detailed experi-
ments may be performed to explore a wider range of human
factors affecting the scenario, and to determine the overall
success rate of the handover task beyond constraints. This is
beyond the scope of this paper, however.
As we were focusing on the ‘‘typical use case’’ of the
handover scenario, in which the human has a working
familiarity with the robot and intends to complete the task
successfully, experiments were constrained accordingly.
Each of the 10 subjects was given clear instructions on how
to successfully complete the task, followed by a practice
session, which ended when the task was successfully com-
pleted three times in a row. Subjects were instructed to try
to complete the task successfully in each test. All subjects
confirmed that they had no physical disability that would
affect their interaction with the robot. The robot started
each test in a random pose. The object was placed in a
fixed location, with random orientation about its vertical
axis (thus changing the orientation of the optical markers,
potentially affecting sensing of the object or influencing
human hand placement on grasping).
Approval for experiments with volunteer subjects was
obtained from the University of the West of England’s
Ethics Committee beforehand. A large, diverse cohort
enables more comprehensive V&V to be carried out, but a
cohort of 10 adult volunteers was deemed sufficient for the
purpose of demonstrating corroborative V&V. We recruited
the volunteers from the Bristol Robotics Laboratory and
the local area. Most had prior robotics experience: three
were postgraduate robotics students, one was a robotics
entrepreneur, four were postdoctoral roboticists. Two had
no prior experience of robotics. All subjects signed a con-
sent form prior to participation.
4.3.1. Textual requirements. For physical experiments,
requirements 1–3 can be verified in their textual form
based on visual observation, informed by video recordings
and user feedback as necessary, e.g., to judge whether the
human was ready or whether something had gone wrong.
Requirements 4–8 refer to software or physical para-
meters that cannot be reliably monitored by visual observa-
tion. It is therefore appropriate to implement objective
monitoring to inform judgments as to whether the textual
requirements are satisfied. To this end, ROS’s built-in rosbag
package was used to record all sensor readings, actuation
signals, robot poses, and high-level control messages sent
during each test. Offline monitoring of these requirements
was achieved by playing back the recordings while running
assertion monitors, as described in Section 4.2.1.
In the case of requirements 6–8, these monitors
depended on the robot’s own sensing systems as the best
available estimates of speed and spatial relationships. In
real-world V&V exercises, independent sensing should be
used.
Requirements 4 and 5 refer to the runtime behavior of
the robot’s high-level control code. Hence, the monitors
used in the simulation may also be applied to the experi-
ment recordings, because the same robot code is used in
each case.
All experiment recordings, along with the assertion
monitor reports from simulations and experiments, are
available from the University of Bristol’s Research Data
Repository (Western et al., 2019).
5. Corroborative V&Vof requirements
1a and 1b
After generating assets for V&V through different V&V
techniques, we can generate corroborative V&V evidence
about the handover scenario, according to the plan
described in Section 4.
To discover whether the V&V techniques corroborate
one another, we compare evidence of the handover success
rate (requirements 1a and 1b) from formal verification (evi-
dence E1) and simulation-based testing (E2). Sources of
discrepancy are identified and investigated in experiments
with the physical system. Experiment-based verification of
the handover success rate in the ‘‘typical use case’’ (E3) is
then generated. More detailed system characteristics mea-
sured during these experiments are used to inform modifi-
cations to the simulator, leading to new evidence (E4) that
agrees closely with E3. These simulations also reveal a
new aspect of the system’s behavior. All insights gained up
to this point are then used to inform modifications to the
formal model, and the resulting evidence (E5) is found to
agree closely with E3 and E4, satisfying our objective of
achieving corroboration between the three V&V tech-
niques. The enacted workflow, depicted in Figure 8, is
described in detail in the subsequent subsections.
5.1. Formal verification: Evidence E1
As described in Section 4.1.1, the formal model includes
probabilities of certain events coming to pass. Using the
probabilistic model of the handover scenario, we are able
to determine that handover has close to 100% success rate:
P(F hand over Successful)= 0:9999948082592586 ð4Þ
That is, almost 100.0% of the time, the handover task
completes successfully. This is a very high probability of
success, meaning that very few paths through the model
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result in failure of the handover task. There are two reasons
for this. First, the model is based on a typical use case (see
Section 4) in which the human’s gaze, hand pressure, and
location are assumed to be correct at all times. This reduces
the likelihood of handover failure. Second, the robot waits
for all of its sensors to report that gaze, pressure, and loca-
tion are correct before releasing its gripper. If any of these
sensors does not report an acceptable value, then the robot
continues to wait. This continues until the modeled robot
eventually ‘‘times out’’ after 100 s. Given that the human
always responds correctly in this version of the model, and
there are no other sources of unreliability in the model, the
only way the model can fail is if the robot times out while
waiting for the sensors to report that the human’s gaze, pres-
sure, and location are within acceptable bounds. As there
are far more paths through the model in which the handover
completes successfully, the probability of success is very
close to 100.0%.
The formal model has shown that BERT 2 satisfies
requirements 1a and 1b:
Requirement 1a. At least 95% of handover attempts should
be completed successfully.
Requirement 1b. At least 60% of handover attempts should
be completed successfully.
However, it is important to note that the formal model is
using very rough estimates of the sensor reliabilities. To
improve the accuracy of the formal model, it is necessary to
find more accurate figures for the sensor reliability. These
could be obtained from manufacturer specifications, or
through experiments with the BERT 2 robot.
Despite the shortcomings of the formal model in its current
form, we can still derive V&V evidence, which we call E1:
E1: the success rate of handover is 100.0%.
5.2. Simulation: Evidence E2 does not
corroborate E1
Evidence E1 can now be verified by another V&V tech-
nique. In this case, we use simulation as it is less costly than
experimentation.
Visual inspection of preliminary simulations indicated
that the object sometimes fell from the robot’s hand on
grasping or during carrying (‘‘grip failure’’), a possibility
not previously considered. A new assertion monitor was
constructed to capture this event in isolation. Additionally,
the monitor for requirement 1 was adapted to the following
form to account for the possibility of grip failure.
Compared with the initial implementation presented in
Section 4.2, an earlier precondition is used to trigger the
monitor: (robot_grasps_object). The original pre-
condition (sensors_OK) is now asserted as a postcondi-
tion and is preceded by an additional postcondition
(object_contacts_robot_hand), which is asserted
repeatedly until sensing is complete. This ensures that a
verdict of ‘‘false’’ will be returned if the robot drops the
object prematurely, regardless of any subsequent behavior.
if (robot_grasps_object)
while !sensing_Done
assert(object_contacts_robot_hand)
assert(sensors_OK)
wait_for(robot_decision)
assert(robot_released_object)
In a set of 100 simulations of the handover task, 80
attempts were then completed successfully. This result
forms evidence E2:
E2: the success rate of handover is 80%.
Note that E1 and E2 disagree with each other, and are
therefore not corroborative. As explained in Section 2.3,
there are a number of potential causes of such a disagree-
ment: inaccuracies in either the system models or the
requirement models, or in the tools. The latter becomes
more unlikely when established tools are used.
In our case, the occurrence of grip failure was clearly the
main source of discrepancy. A modeling inaccuracy was
present in at least one of the two V&V techniques used: the
formal model implicitly assumed a grip failure rate of 0%,
whereas simulation indicated 20%. Both the formal model
and the simulator assets were modified to account for this,
as is shown in the following subsections.
5.3. Experiments: Evidence E3
Before committing resources to user experiments, a set of
hardware experiments was conducted to characterize the
robot’s actual grip failure rate. BERT 2 was programmed to
carry out the grasp-and-carry portion of the handover task
100 times, and grip failure was found to occur in three
cases.
At this point, despite some discrepancy, formal model-
ing and simulation were in agreement that the system satis-
fied the research-level minimum success rate of 60%.
Furthermore, the simulation-based estimate was deemed
likely to be conservatively low, owing to the inaccurately
Fig. 8. Simplified representation of the corroborative V&V
workflow enacted in our case study, denoting the sequence in
which evidence items E1 – E5 were produced from individual
V&V techniques.
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high grip failure rate. It was therefore deemed worthwhile
to proceed to user experiments.
User experiments were carried out as described in
Section 4.3. Results are summarized in Table 1. To deter-
mine whether it was appropriate to treat our experimental
data as independent samples of a single distribution, we
investigated whether there was any noticeable effect of
learning or prior robotics experience on the outcome of a
test. A statistical analysis was performed using IBM
SPSS v23.0. A Kruskal–Wallis H test did not indicate a
significant effect of the robotics experience categories on
the number of handovers completed successfully after
training (x2(3)= 1:5, p= 0:682) or on the number of train-
ing runs required (x2(3)= 2:872, p= 0:412). Furthermore,
a Spearman correlation calculation revealed no significant
correlation between the test number (1–10) and the total
number of human-related failures in that test across sub-
jects (r= 0:220, p= 0:541, two-tailed). It is possible that
more extensive testing with a larger cohort would reveal
weak but statistically significant effects of these para-
meters. However, for the purposes of demonstrating our
method, our cohort and experiment design were deemed to
be adequate based on these results.
The handover was successfully completed in 88 out of
100 tests. As in simulation, this can be taken as an estimate
of the true success rate of the experimental system.
E3: the success rate of handover is 88% in the typical use case.
Here, the ‘‘typical use case’’ is that described in Section
4.3.
Again we found notable disagreement between E3 and
the previously generated evidence. A more specific discre-
pancy had already been identified in terms of the grip fail-
ure rate. To seek closer agreement between the three V&V
techniques, we explored the potential sources of discre-
pancy in greater detail.
The video recordings and ROS logs, including sensor
data, were reviewed to confirm the faults responsible for
each failed handover in the user experiments. The failure
rate for each failure mode was identified as the number of
occurrences divided by the number of opportunities for that
fault to occur. The results are listed in the first column of
Table 2. ‘‘False negative’’ here was defined relative to the
subject’s observable actions. Thus, false negative pressure
sensing was identified where the review of logs and videos
indicated that the subject was observably applying pressure
to the object but the sensing threshold was not exceeded.
Similarly, false negative location sensing was identified
where the subject’s hand was on the object during the sen-
sing period but the robot’s location sensor returned a nega-
tive result. Rates of other possible failure modes (e.g., time
outs or false negative gaze sensing) are implicitly estimated
to be 0% based on these experiments. This should not be
taken as evidence that these modes never occur, only that
they are rare. Also, rates of false positive sensor readings
could not be defined because, after training, there were no
cases in which the subject did not apply their gaze, pres-
sure, and hand location according to the protocol.
5.4. Modifying the simulator asset
The observed rates for individual failure modes were taken
as the best available estimates of those properties in the typ-
ical use case and were used to tune the simulator asset (and,
subsequently, the formal model asset) to represent that case.
In the previous simulations, the grip failure rate of 20%
was clearly much higher than the experimental observation
of 3%, while the simulated sensing did not reproduce the
other observed failure modes. Several aspects of the simula-
tor were refined with the aim of approximating the experi-
mentally observed rates of individual failure modes without
sacrificing realism.
The accuracy of the simulated dynamics of the robot’s
handling of the object was improved by replacing default
or placeholder values with more realistic estimates of
Table 1. User experiment results for the cohort of 10 volunteers, by subject. Robotics experience is denoted by N (none), S
(postgraduate student), D (postdoctoral roboticist), or E (robotics entrepreneur). Failure modes are denoted by R (robot grip failure), P
(false negative pressure sensing), and L (false negative location sensing).
Subject ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean
Experience E D S N N D S D D S
No. of training runs 5 4 6 6 6 3 3 6 3 6 4.8
No. of successes (post-training) 9 10 8 7 9 10 10 6 9 10 8.8
Failure modes P P, L R, P, P R L, P, L, P P
Table 2. Test outcomes and occurrence rates of individual
failure modes for the typical use case, according to 100 user
experiments and 500 simulations after tuning.
User experiments Simulation
Number of tests 100 500
Handover success 88.0% (88/100) 87.8% (439/500)
Runtime error 0.0% (0/100) 0.2% (1/500)
Grip failure 2.0% (2/100) 1.6% (8/499)
False negative gaze 0.0% (0/98) 0.0% (0/491)
False negative pressure 7.1% (7/98) 6.5% (32/491)
False negative location 3.1% (3/98) 4.2% (21/491)
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inertial properties, material properties, and joint torque or
velocity limits.
The instances of false negative ‘‘location’’ sensing were
identified as arising from the motion-tracking system
briefly losing track of the object (hand location is measured
relative to the object) and reassigning its location to another
point. Mimicking this behavior, the simulated motion track-
ing was set to reassign the observed location of the object
(but not the person’s hand or head) to an arbitrary point in
3.1% of readings.
Based on the recordings, all cases of false negative pres-
sure sensing seen in the user experiments were attributed to
the subject pulling on the object more gently than in other
cases. The exact forcing pattern applied by the subjects
could not be extracted from the experiment data. Instead,
the lower threshold of the distribution from which the simu-
lated human pulling force was selected was reduced from
5 N to 1 N through a process of trial and error to approxi-
mate the failure rate seen in user experiments.
After tuning, a set of 500 simulations was run. In all
tests, the simulated human enacted the trace of high-level
actions corresponding to the typical use case, remaining
engaged in the task and applying gaze, pressure, and loca-
tion within the relevant bounds. The results, included in
Table 2, indicate that the tuning process was successful in
approximating the individual failure rates observed in user
experiments. Close corroboration is also achieved in the
handover success rate, although it must be acknowledged
that this correspondence slightly overestimates the true
accuracy of the simulator; larger errors are seen in the rates
of individual failure modes. Nevertheless, we have
improved confidence in the simulation as a representation
of the physical system and in the corroborative evidence
provided by each V&V technique. E3 is now supported by
new evidence from simulation-based testing:
E4: The success rate of handover is 87.8% in the typical use
case.
Furthermore, the simulations exposed a failure mode
not previously considered. In one test, the handover success
monitor returned no result and inspection of the logs
revealed that the robot’s control code crashed because of a
runtime error:
RuntimeError: Unable to connect to move_group
action server ‘place’ within allotted time
(2)
This message indicates that a time out occurred when
invoking the robot’s motion planning module. The robot’s
high-level control code does not include any means of han-
dling such exceptions. Although rare, these events might
significantly affect the user’s trust if they occur in deploy-
ment, and could lead to violations of critical safety require-
ments. In our case, the error caused the only violations of
requirements 4 and 5. The exposure of the error, which
required high-volume testing and a realistic implementation
of the system, demonstrates a key strength of simulation as
a complement to formal modeling and user experiments. It
is conceivable that the error never occurs in the actual sys-
tem, e.g., owing to differences in computational load dur-
ing simulation. However, further testing on the real system
cannot rule out the possibility completely. A more conser-
vative approach is to adopt the simulation-based estimate
of the error’s frequency as the basis for further corrobora-
tive V&V and design recommendations.
5.5. Modifying the formal model asset
Now that we have verified determined simulation evidence
E3, we can attempt to corroborate it using formal verifica-
tion to address the discrepancy discovered between E1 and
E3 during the first V&V cycle. As described in Section 5.1,
evidence E1 generated by formal verification disagrees with
evidence E3, generated by experiments:
E1: the success rate of handover is 100.0%.
E3: the success rate of handover is 88% in the typical use case.
The formal model currently uses placeholder estimates
for the reliability of the gaze, pressure, and location sen-
sors on the BERT 2 robot. However, using some of the
experimental data in Table 2, it is possible to replace the
corresponding estimates in the formal model with more
accurate values. In particular, we can use the following
values:
 Gaze sensor, false negative: 0.0%;
 Pressure sensor, false negative: 7.1%;
 Location sensor, false negative: 3.1%.
False negatives and true positives are mutually exclu-
sive, since the former refers to when the person’s gaze,
pressure, or location is correct but the sensor reports (incor-
rectly) that it is not, and the latter refers to when the per-
son’s gaze, pressure, or location is correct and the sensor
reports (correctly) that it is. Therefore, we can infer true
positive values:
 Gaze sensor, false negative: 0.0%, true positive: 100.0%;
 Pressure sensor, false negative: 7.1%, true positive:
92.9%;
 Location sensor, false negative: 3.1%, true positive:
96.9%.
As the experiments did not report any situations where
there were false positives, we assume that the rate of false
positive sensor failures is 0.0% for each sensor, and there-
fore the rate of true negatives for each sensor is 100.0%.
We can now set the probabilities in the model
accordingly:
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const double pGazeFN = 0.00;
const double pGazeTP = 1-pGazeFN;
const double pGazeFP = 0.00;
const double pGazeTN = 1-pGazeFP;
const double pPressureFN = 0.071428571;
const double pPressureTP = 1-pPressureFN;
const double pPressureFP = 0.00;
const double pPressureTN = 1-pPressureFP;
const double pLocationFN = 0.030612245;
const double pLocationTP = 1-pLocationFN;
const double pLocationFP = 0.00;
const double pLocationTN = 1-pLocationFP;
Verifying the model, we can obtain the success rate of
the handover task:
P(F hand over Successful)= 0:9999954384256133 ð5Þ
It can be seen that the success rate remains at almost
100.0%. This is to be expected, as the sensor failure rates
have changed slightly, but it remains the case that the only
way for the handover to fail is for the robot to time out.
There is still a significant difference between this suc-
cess rate and the success rate reported by simulation
(87.8%) and experiments (88%). This may be, in part, a
result of the way in which the sensors were modeled in the
formal model. It was assumed that sensors might make any
number of ‘‘samples,’’ while the robot waited for the person
to grasp the object in the correct way. Each one of these
samples is a separate event, in which the sensor takes a
reading that is reported back to the robot’s decision-making
system. Therefore, each time the sensor takes a reading
there is a probability of failure, and false positives and
negatives are possible. The formal model reflects this, and
the failure rates given apply to each reading taken by the
sensor, rather than the average failure rate per handover.
The PRISM code defining the gaze sensor module was as
follows:
module gazeSensor
gazeSensorState : [0..1000] init null;
[senseGaze] robotState=waitForGPLUpdate &
gazeState=gazeOk -. pGazeFN:
(gazeSensorState’=
gazeNotOk) + pGazeTP:
(gazeSensorState’=gazeOk);
[senseGaze] robotState=waitForGPLUpdate &
gazeState=gazeNotOk -. pGazeTN:
(gazeSensorState’=
gazeNotOk) + pGazeFP:
(gazeSensorState’=gazeOk);
endmodule
The first transition rule says that if the robot is currently
waiting for the person to grasp the object
(waitForGPLUpdate) and the gaze is okay (i.e., the
person is looking in the right direction), then the value of
gazeSensorState is updated to either gazeOk or
gazeNotOk, depending on the probability of false nega-
tive and true positive. The second transition rule does
something similar for the case where the person is not
looking in the right direction. Note that the only guards on
these transitions specify that the robot is waiting for the
person to grasp the object and that the gaze is either okay
or not okay. (The synchronization senseGaze is simply
used to keep track of how long sensing is taking within a
timekeeper module and is not relevant in this example.)
Therefore, these sensor readings can happen any number
of times while the robot is waiting for the person to be
ready to receive the object and complete the handover task.
This way of modeling the handover scenario produces
less accurate results when combined with the failure rates
established by experiment. This is because the failure rates
determined were based on the number of experiments in
which, for example, the pressure sensor was seen to give a
false negative reading. For example, the probability of 0.071
for a pressure sensor false negative reading was obtained by
dividing the number of experiments in which a false nega-
tive reading occurred at some point (7) by the total number
of experiments not interrupted by gripper failure (98).
Therefore, it would be more accurate to re-model the
scenario in a way that reflects experimental reality; that is,
the probability of a sensor failure for a handover of the
object should be based on the observed average rate of fail-
ure of that sensor. This was achieved by modifying the
gaze, pressure, and location sensor modules in the PRISM
model:
module gazeSensor
gazeSensorState : [0..1000] init null;
gazeSensorSet: bool init false;
[senseGaze] robotState=waitForGPLUpdate &
gazeState=gazeOk & !gazeSensorSet -.
pGazeFN: (gazeSensorState’=gazeNotOk) &
(gazeSensorSet’=true) + pGazeTP:
(gazeSensorState’=gazeOk) &
(gazeSensorSet’=true);
[senseGaze] robotState=waitForGPLUpdate &
gazeState=gazeNotOk & !gazeSensorSet -.
pGazeTN: (gazeSensorState’=gazeNotOk) &
(gazeSensorSet’=true) + pGazeFP:
(gazeSensorState’=gazeOk) &
(gazeSensorSet’=true);
endmodule
In this revised model, each sensor’s state can be set only
once. For example, for the gaze sensor, this is done by
introducing a Boolean variable gazeSensorSet that is
initially false, but is set to true once a sensor reading has
been taken, and is never again set to false. Therefore, this
model reflects the experiments more closely.
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Verifying the new model gives us a new value for the
reliability of the handover task:
P(F hand over Successful)= 0:9001457729154516 ð6Þ
The handover task now completes successfully with a
probability of 90.0%. This is closer to the simulation and
experiment results of 87.8% and 88.0%, respectively, but
there is still a noticeable difference. One possible reason
for this is that the gripper failure rate, as determined by
experiment and built into the simulation, is not yet modeled
in PRISM. The following transition describes what happens
within the robot module once the gaze, pressure, and loca-
tion are found to be correct:
[tick] robotState=GPLOk -. (handContents’
=nothing) &
(robotState’=handoverSuccessful);
Here, once the robot’s state reaches GPLOk, indicating
that gaze, pressure, and location are within acceptable
bounds, the robot releases its gripper and hands over the
object to the person. Therefore, the handContents vari-
able is updated to reflect that the robot’s hand or gripper is
now empty, and the robot’s state is updated to show that
handover has been successful. To introduce the possibility
of gripper failure, this transition was modified to incorpo-
rate a probabilistic choice:
[tick] robotState=GPLOk -. pGripperOk:
(handContents’=
nothing) & (robotState’=
handoverSuccessful) +
pGripperFailure: (handContents’=nothing) &
(robotState’=handoverUnsuccessful);
Now, one of two things can happen. The first possibility
is that the handover completes successfully, as before, with
a probability of pGripperOk. The second is that the
handover fails, with probability pGripperFailure.
These two probabilities are set like so:
const double pGripperFailure = 0.02;
const double pGripperOk = 1 -
pGripperFailure;
Here, ‘‘pGripperFailure’’ is set to 0.02 in accordance
with the gripper failure rate of 2% determined by experi-
ment (see Table 2). We verify the model once again to
determine a handover success rate of 88.2%:
P(F hand over Successful)= 0:8821428574571426 ð7Þ
In a similar way, a new transition was introduced into
the transition system to model the possibility of failure of
BERT 2’s motion planning module, as described in Section
5.4. This transition occurs at the start of the handover task
as the robot prepares to move its arm to grasp the object
for handover. The revised transition rule incorporates
probabilities for the success or failure of the motion plan-
ning module:
[activateRobot] robotState=waiting -.
pMotionOk:
(robotState’= moveHandToObjectLocation) +
pMotionFailure: (robotState’=motionError);
These probabilities were based on the data shown in
Table 2:
const double pMotionFailure = 0.002; // 0.2%
const double pMotionOk = 1 - pMotionFailure;
Verifying the model once more gives an updated hand-
over success rate of 88.0%:
P(F hand over Successful)= 0:8803785717422283 ð8Þ
Thus, the final evidence provided by formal verification
may be stated as:
E5: the success rate of handover is 88.0% in the typical use
case.
After conducting corroborative V&V of the handover
task for the BERT 2 system, it was found that all V&V
techniques were corroborative on the probability of a suc-
cessful handover. The probabilities are shown in Table 3.
Having established confidence in our models using cor-
roborative V&V, we can assert that in the typical use case
requirement 1b is satisfied but requirement 1a is not.
6. V&Vof requirements 2–8
In the previous section, we focused our efforts on the V&V
of requirements 1a and 1b in order to demonstrate corro-
borative V&V of a robotic system. However, for the sake
of completeness and in line with best practices in engineer-
ing, we also attempted V&V of requirements 2–8 using
each of the three V&V techniques. These V&V results are
presented without reference to corroboration, but corro-
borative V&V could be applied to requirements 2–8 in a
similar manner to requirements 1a and 1b.
It can be seen in the following subsections that the dif-
ferent V&V techniques do not all agree on how well
requirements 2–8 are met. This is similar to the case study
for requirements 1a and 1b before corroborative V&V.
Given enough time, it would be possible to apply the corro-
borative V&V approach to this expanded set of
Table 3. Results of corroborative V&V.
Formal verification 88.0%
Simulation 87.8%
Experiments 88.0%
Average 87.9% 6 0.1%
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requirements in order to find the source of the disagree-
ments between V&V techniques and to improve the level
of corroboration between them.
6.1. Experiments
For the user experiments, the full set of textual requirements
was evaluated through a combination of offline assertion
monitoring and visual observation, as described in Section
4.3.1. Table 4 presents the verdicts returned from each indi-
vidual test. Requirement 1 is included for completeness.
Note that for requirements 4–8, up to seven of the missing
verdicts were attributable to errors in the recording process
rather than the tests themselves.
As noted previously, the handover success rate in the
user experiments satisfies requirement 1b but violates
requirement 1a. Correspondingly, violations of requirement
3 arise from the cases of false negative sensor readings.
Additionally, we see that requirement 7 is violated in 78
out of 98 tests; the robot occasionally violates its speed
threshold on resetting, presumably depending on its initial
pose. A notable ‘‘coverage hole’’ is seen in this test set for
requirement 2, as the human was judged to be ready for the
handover in every test. All other requirements were covered
in at least 25 tests, and no other violations were observed.
6.2. Simulation-based testing
Table 5 presents the results of the assertions monitored in
the same 500 simulation-based tests summarized in Table
2, representing the typical use case. Comparing Table 5
with the experiment results in Table 4, we see broad corro-
boration, but with several noteworthy discrepancies, dis-
cussed next.
All assertions were covered—i.e., all monitors were trig-
gered at least once—except for requirement 8. This
indicates that the human and robot should not come within
10 cm of each other during the interaction. While this is
possible given the length of the object to be handed over,
the experiments revealed that closer proximities are seen in
typical use. Hence, this constitutes a notable coverage hole
in these tests.
Contrary to the experiment results, requirement 2 was
covered in several tests and no violations of requirement 3
were observed. Further investigation of this discrepancy
revealed a potential requirements inaccuracy; the assertion
corresponding to this requirement expressed ‘‘the human is
ready’’ as sensors_ok. In this sense, the assertion moni-
tor verifies only the high-level control of the robot, dis-
counting the possibility of sensor errors. Hence, the results
are still informative, but some modification of the assertion
monitors would be required to achieve a more comprehen-
sive V&V of these requirements.
As noted previously, requirements 4 and 5 were violated
by the single runtime error. The observation that require-
ment 7 is violated in 63 out of 500 tests is consistent with
the experimental results.
6.3. Formal verification
Requirement 2 says that if the human is not ready, the robot
shall not hand over the object. It is formalized as follows:
P G
:
gaze State= gazeOk^
pressure State= pressureOk^
location State= locationOk
0
@
1
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)
: robot State= hand over Successful_
robot State= handoverUnsuccessful
 
2
666664
3
777775
0
BBBBB@
1
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ð9Þ
This property says that it is always the case that if the
human’s gaze, pressure, and hand location are not correct,
Table 4. User experiments: Results on textual requirements from 100 tests. ‘‘Covered’’ indicates the number of tests from which a
verdict could be achieved. ‘‘Passed’’ and ‘‘Failed’’ indicate the number of tests in which the requirement was deemed to be satisfied or
violated, respectively. ‘‘Pass rate’’ is calculated as the ratio ‘‘Passed’’:‘‘Covered’’.
Requirement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Covered 100 0 98 93 93 25 98 90
Passed 88 0 88 93 93 25 78 90
Failed 12 0 10 0 0 0 20 0
Pass rate 0.88 – 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0
Table 5. Simulation: Assertion coverage and results corresponding to each of the requirements (corrected for missing results) in a set
of 500 tests.
Requirement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Covered 500 53 446 500 500 500 500 0
Passed 439 53 446 499 499 500 437 0
Failed 61 0 0 1 1 0 63 0
Pass rate 0.878 1.0 1.0 0.998 0.998 1.0 0.874 –
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then it is not the case that the robot has attempted to hand
over the object. (Handing over the object results in either
the ‘‘handoverSuccessful’’ or ‘‘handoverUnsuccessful’’
states.) Verifying this property in PRISM gives a probability
of 1.0, meaning that it is always true.
Requirement 3, which says that, ‘‘if the human is ready,
the robot shall hand over the object,’’ is formalized in a sim-
ilar way:
P G
gaze State= gazeOk^
pressure State= pressureOk^
location State= locationOk
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It was expected that this property would be evaluated by
PRISM as less than 1.0, owing to the possibility of sensor
and gripper failures. Indeed, verification using PRISM gave
a result of 0.8803785717422283.
Requirement 4 states that the robot always reaches a
decision within a threshold of time. This is formalized as
follows:
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Here, the phrase ‘‘reaches a decision’’ was taken to
mean that the robot had decided to release the object. In
the model, this can result in ‘‘handoverSuccessful’’ if the
gripper works properly or ‘‘handoverUnsuccessful’’ if the
gripper fails. The requirement specifies that this should
happen within ‘‘a threshold of time’’ but does not specify
the amount of time. In our model, we specified that the
gripper release would take 2.0 s, based on consultation
with the robot’s users. Time was quantified in the model
using an ‘‘objectReleaseTimer,’’ which is set to zero when
the robot determines that the humans’ gaze, pressure, and
location are acceptable. The objectReleaseTimer was set to
work in 0.1 s intervals in order to provide adequate preci-
sion without increasing the size of the state space to intract-
able levels. Therefore, this property captures requirement 4
as it states that once the robot has found the human’s gaze,
pressure, and location to be acceptable, then it will attempt
to release the gripper (either successfully or unsuccessfully)
within 2.0 s.
This property was verified and the probability was deter-
mined to be 0.9999999999999996, or 100.0%, allowing for
floating point arithmetic precision errors in PRISM’S compu-
tation engine (Parker, 2016).
Requirement 5 states that the robot shall always either
time out, decide to release the object, or decide not to
release the object. It is formalized as follows:
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This property specifies the probability that it is always
the case that the robot eventually decides to release the
object (either successfully or unsuccessfully) or times out
while waiting for the human’s gaze, pressure, and location
to update to acceptable values. The latter case, where the
robot times out, is effectively the same as the robot decid-
ing not to hand over the object.
This property was verified, revealing a probability of
0.9979999999999996; this was expected, as the runtime
error encountered in Section 5.4, which was also included
in the PRISM model, has a failure rate of 0.2% or 0.002.
To check that this was the case, another property was speci-
fied which says that the robot can behave as expected in
the previous property, or eventually encounter a runtime
error:
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This property was verified, resulting in a probability of
0.9999999999999993, or 100.0%, allowing for precision
errors.
Requirement 6 states that the robot shall not close its
hand when the human is too close, requirement 7 says that
the robot shall start in a restricted speed mode, and require-
ment 8 says that if the robot is within 10 cm of the human
the robot’s hand speed is less than 250 mm/s. These proper-
ties could not be modeled, specified, or verified formally
as the PRISM model of the handover scenario does not
include a model of a proximity sensor, and does not allow
for speeds or distances to to be set within the control sys-
tem. It is possible, in principle, to re-model the scenario to
include such detail. However, adding complexity to the
model adds to the computational resources required to ver-
ify the model. In some cases, formal verification can
become intractable. Therefore, it may be more practical for
V&V of requirements 6–8 to rely more heavily on evidence
gained from simulation and experiment where physical
properties can be much more fine-grained.
6.4. Computational demands
Properties (4) to (13) were verified against several different
PRISM models representing the handover task. These models
were created during the corroborative V&V process shown
in Section 5. The complexity of the PRISM model checking
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for these properties is shown in Table 6. From left to right,
the columns show the requirement and property verified,
numbers of states and transitions used, time required for
building the model and time and memory required to verify
the model. PRISM 4.2.1 was used on an eight-core Intel
Core i7 laptop with 16 GB of memory running Ubuntu
Linux 12.04.
It can be seen that properties (10)–(13) took significantly
longer to verify than the other properties. This is most prob-
ably the result of the use of nested temporal logic operators
(e.g., F , G , X , U) in these properties compared with proper-
ties (4)–(8), which use simpler formulas. For properties
(9)–(13), it took the same time to build the model (69.4 s),
as these properties were all checked against a single PRISM
model file, which needed to be built only once before these
properties could be verified. The amount of memory used
for property (9) was not returned by PRISM, so this value
has been omitted from the table.
Simulation-based testing was performed using ROS
Indigo, and Gazebo v2.2.3 on a quad-core Intel Core i7
laptop with 8 GB of memory running Ubuntu Linux 14.04.
With all online monitors running, simulations were exe-
cuted at a speed of 0:8 × real-time on average, taking 69.3
s per test. Of course, with the advantages of batch and par-
allel processing, simulation-based testing remains consider-
ably faster than physical experiments.
7. Discussion
Through the corroborative combination of a number of
V&V techniques, namely formal verification, simulation-
based testing, and experiments, we have determined the
handover success rate (requirements 1a and 1b) with greater
confidence than could be achieved by any of the V&V
techniques in isolation. Each of the different V&V tech-
niques was used iteratively to corroborate the evidence
found by the other techniques during the corroborative
V&V process. Although the experiments alone would have
returned a similar value for the handover success rate,
achieving corroboration in model checking and in
simulation gives a higher level of confidence that the
experimental results are correct and that the robot system
meets its requirements.
The corroborative V&V process exposed key differences
between the models used in the V&V techniques, specifi-
cally the false negative and true positive rates for the gaze,
pressure, and location sensors, as well as the grip failure rate.
For requirements 4–6, the combination of simulation-based
testing and formal verification exposed important system
behaviors not observed in the experiments, i.e., requirement
violations. The observed runtime error (which caused viola-
tions of requirements 4 and 5) could only be exposed
through a large number of tests in simulation. The subse-
quent inclusion of this error in the formal model and the
simulator ensured that its impact on the behavior of the sys-
tem could be explored with more coverability using formal
verification and simulation-based testing. Furthermore, cor-
rected models for these two V&V techniques were obtained
to balance coverability capabilities, expressivity, and realism.
Corroborative V&V has demonstrated that (i) the system
satisfies requirement 1b and (ii) the more stringent version,
requirement 1a, is not satisfied, to a greater degree than if
the individual V&V techniques were used without corro-
boration. Based on the insights gained during the V&V pro-
cess, several design recommendations could be made to
improve the handover success rate and to satisfy other
requirements. The sensing process could be made more
robust to sudden changes in the human motion, or to reduce
the number of handover failures due to sensing errors
through mechanisms such as ‘‘debouncing’’ for the sensor
readings. (Debouncing prevents a single event from creat-
ing more than one sensor signal.) Adjustments to the robot’s
hardware or motion planning strategy might improve the
gripper failure rate. A speed limit needs to be introduced
when the robot is reset, to avoid dangerous unintended col-
lisions. Also, as uncontrollable faults can be encountered
during execution, we could instrument our code to perform
diagnostics and fault recovery strategies.
For demonstration purposes, we focused on achieving
corroboration relating to a particular set of requirements,
Table 6. Complexity of formal verification using PRISM.
Build Verification
Requirement Property States Transitions T (s) T (s) M (kB)
1 (4) 42,960 236,643 36.8 0.203 2,253
1 (5) 31,120 150,955 61.4 0.147 1,741
1 (6) 15,614 54,969 84.0 0.062 997
1 (7) 15,615 54,971 90.0 0.057 999
1 (8) 15,623 54,998 40.6 0.053 1,003
2 (9) 15,623 54,998 69.4 0.002 *
3 (10) 15,623 54,998 69.4 20.3 1,536
4 (11) 15,623 54,998 69.4 17.7 1,007
5 (12) 15,623 54,998 69.4 24.9 1,843
5 (13) 15,623 54,998 69.4 50.2 2,048
**
= Value not returned by PRISM.
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requirements 1a and 1b. As our examination of require-
ments 2–8 demonstrates, corroboration on some require-
ments does not entail corroboration across all requirements.
For requirements 1a and 1b, the end result was that all
V&V techniques agreed on the success rate of handover
within a range of 60:1%. In an ideal world, all V&V tech-
niques use accurate models of the world, and are accurate
with respect to one another, so that V&V evidence gener-
ated with one technique should also be found valid by
another. In practice, this might not happen. If two V&V
techniques do not agree, then we might look for inaccura-
cies in the system models, the requirements models, or the
tools, as described in Section 2.3. However, after a number
of iterations through the corroborative V&V diagram
(Figure 1), we might still have V&V techniques in disagree-
ment. One possible reason might be project constraints: we
might lack the resources to continue to address inaccura-
cies. Another reason could be that the V&V techniques
might be lacking: for example, model checking for formal
verification can often be hindered by the state space explo-
sion, which limits the accuracy of models that can be
checked. Alternatively, we might lack the computational
resources to explore sufficient numbers of simulated experi-
ments, or we might lack the personnel to conduct sufficient
numbers of real experiments.
Therefore, in practice, corroboration between V&V
techniques might not be possible. At this point, we might
assess whether our V&V techniques are up to the job.
Perhaps we should use an automated theorem prover rather
than a model checker? Or perhaps a two-dimensional phys-
ical simulation would work better than a three-dimensional
one? Perhaps we could create the simulation using a differ-
ent programming language or use a more powerful com-
puter? The list goes on.
We might also decide that exact corroboration is not nec-
essary if all the V&V techniques are within an acceptable
range. For example, we might have three different pieces of
evidence, each generated by a different V&V technique:
Ei: System reliability is 92%.
Ej: System reliability is 98%.
Ek: System reliability is 93%.
Clearly all three pieces of evidence are not in agreement
with the others. However, the lowest value for system relia-
bility given is 92%, which means that all three V&V tech-
niques agree on the following statement: ‘‘System
reliability is 92% or greater.’’ Note that this statement is
implicit in evidence Ei, Ej, and Ek. In this case, we have
used corroborative V&V to allow us to determine a mini-
mum value for reliability. This value can then be checked
with respect to system requirements to see whether the sys-
tem being modeled is sufficiently reliable.
There may be other reasons, beyond those discussed in
this section, why we cannot reach corroboration between
V&V techniques, and there may be other ways to remedy
this beyond range-based statements like the one described.
It is intended that the suggestions given here may provide
direction for managing corroborative V&V in practical
applications, as well as acknowledging that corroborative
V&V is not perfect. Rather, it is an approach to using V&V
techniques in conjunction with one another to provide a
higher degree of confidence that a system will satisfy its
requirements.
As we have improved the accuracy of our assets on the
basis of the results presented in this paper, we could use
the same V&V techniques to further explore the HRI. For
example, it is possible to explore human behaviors that
deviate from the typical use case, and incorporate aspects
of user uncertainty and variability beyond those used in
this paper. A reformulation of the system and requirement
models under the new conditions might be necessary, as
system traits (e.g., failure rates) characterized under one set
of constraints will not necessarily hold for other sets of
constraints. In such cases, the V&V engineer should judge
whether any prior asset modifications can be generalized to
broader scenarios.
The V&V efforts toward corroboration can be helped by
limiting (or biasing) the explored region of the HRI state
space to seek cases in which the V&V techniques provide
contradictory results. In our case study, we have employed
a probabilistic formulation of the requirements that is rele-
vant to HRI system as non-determinism may arise not only
from the environment but also from the robot and the cou-
pling between them (ROS-based robots exhibit high levels
of concurrency and run on non-real-time operating sys-
tems). Hence, we can compute conditional probabilities,
such as, ‘‘Given that the robot’s gripper fails, what is the
probability that the robot warns the user before the object
drops?’’ that lead to conditional evidence.
In more complex scenarios, it might become more diffi-
cult to identify appropriate modifications to achieve better
agreement between assets. Modifications to system models
may be informed by knowledge gained during V&V. For
example, useful insights may be contributed from systema-
tic risk analyses, such as fault tree analysis or HAZOP
(hazard operability). The latter has recently been proposed
for use in human–robot interactions to manage the inherent
complexity and uncertainty in such systems (Guiochet
et al., 2013).
Increased modeling effort is an evident limitation of cor-
roborative V&V. However, the use of several V&V tech-
niques brings savings to this effort. As our case study
demonstrates, early use of more abstract methods allows
gradual commitment of resources to more realistic and
expensive techniques. Discrepancies can highlight over-
sights and areas of uncertainty, informing the judicious use
of more expensive techniques (e.g., to characterize the
uncertain grip failure rate before proceeding with user
experiments in our case study).
For more comprehensive V&V efforts, coverage-driven
verification (Araiza-Illan et al., 2016) may be used with
corroborative V&V, pursuing coverage of the system in a
systematic way in simulations or experiments. Hybrid
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systems methods (Julius et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2006)
might also be usefully incorporated into corroborative
V&V, although reducing entire HRI scenarios to manage-
able hybrid models is likely to be challenging.
The object handover is only an example of a huge vari-
ety of case studies available in the HRI domain.
Nonetheless, it is of uttermost interest in HRI, as close-
proximity manipulation tasks may be considered in a
plethora of applications, such as the manufacture of white
goods, cooperative handling and attachment of large sub-
components of airplane structures in aerospace assemblies,
or care of older people with early stage dementia by feed-
ing them soup.
While our approach can be extended to any HRI appli-
cation, in principle, an awareness of the limitations of each
V&V technique is essential. For example, human behavior
is notoriously difficult to analyze and assess, with open-
ended and physically unconstrained interactions between
humans and robots being some of the most difficult prob-
lems in HRI research. In complex and nuanced scenarios,
we may wish to emphasize the use of experimentation and
real-world operations over simulation and formal verifica-
tion as providing core evidence for corroborative V&V.
However, it is likely that many complex interactions can be
broken down into simpler sub-interactions, such as object
handover. In these cases, the high levels of efficiency, cov-
erability, and precision offered by formal verification and
simulation-based testing can be more readily utilized.
7.1. Use of other V&V techniques
The corroborative V&V approach can also make use of
other V&V techniques, as well as their accompanying
assets. For example, hardware-in-the-loop experiments
allow hardware modules to be used alongside simulated
hardware in order to verify the behavior of those modules
(Martin and Emami, 2006). In terms of abstraction level,
hardware-in-the-loop fits between simulation and experi-
mentation, as it makes use of both. Hardware-in-the-loop
experiments can verify textual requirements as well as code
assertions, and the system model is a combination of the
hardware modules and simulator. Therefore, we could add
hardware-in-the-loop as a V&V technique within a corro-
borative V&V approach (see Figure 9).
Of course, we could also expand corroborative V&V to
include operations of the robotic system once it is deployed
in the ‘‘real world.’’ Once the system is deployed, it is being
used and operated by its end-users, so naturally, its
‘‘requirement model’’ is the end-users’ actual requirements,
rather than a model captured in natural or formal languages
(see Figure 10). We could also use other V&V techniques,
like coverage-driven verification (Araiza-Illan et al., 2015).
The entire corroborative V&V approach is summarized
in Figure 11. A set of requirements models (shown in rec-
tangles) is linked to system models (shown in octagons)
through a set of V&V techniques. Information gained from
V&V techniques can be compared with other V&V
techniques, shown by bold arrows. This information can
also be fed back to requirements models and system mod-
els (i.e., the V&V assets) in order to refine them to improve
accuracy if the V&V techniques have shown that there is
insufficient corroboration. The assets can then be refined
and compared with one another, before conducting further
V&V until all techniques corroborate one another. Of
course, as we have shown in this paper, this is an ideal
case, and full corroboration will often not be possible.
However, the practice of corroborative V&V allows and
encourages a systematic approach to reaching agreement
between V&V approaches. In turn, this approach to V&V
produces a higher quality of verification and validation
than could be achieved by using the individual approaches
separately.
8. Comparison with other approaches
In this paper, we have described corroborative V&V: an
approach to V&V of robotic systems based on combining
Fig. 9. Corroborative V&V including hardware-in-the-loop.
Fig. 10. Corroborative V&V including real-world operations.
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different V&V techniques and comparing the evidence gen-
erated by them. This was motivated partly by a well-known
issue: the use of a single method for V&V results in a com-
promise between examining the full state space of a system
(in this case, of an HRI) and modeling the system in satis-
factory detail.
8.1. Formal methods for V&V
Model checking (Clarke et al., 1999; Fisher, 2011), a for-
mal method used for V&V, is exhaustive over the state
space of a model but requires abstraction of the full system
(e.g., the high-level control algorithms, low-level control,
and mechanical behavior, and the code that runs in the
robot) into a finite number of states. For this reason, formal
verification can be applied to the analysis of high-level
decision-making engines for safety and liveness purposes,
exemplified by our previous work in HRI scenarios
(Bordini et al., 2009; Dixon et al., 2014; Gainer et al.,
2017;Webster et al., 2015). Reasoning and high-level con-
trol algorithms have been verified through formal verifica-
tion and model checking for other kinds of autonomous
robots, such as ground robots (Mitsch et al., 2017),
unmanned aircraft (Webster et al., 2013), and multi-robot
swarm systems (Dixon et al., 2012; Konur et al., 2012).
Theorem proving, another formal method, has also been
used to verify some of the control code of an autonomous
robot (Walter et al., 2010) and multi-robot swarms
(Behdenna et al., 2009), highlighting the same modeling
challenges in terms of abstractions versus accuracy and
expressivity as in model checking.
8.2. Simulation for V&V
Although formal models can be run in simulation-mode
when model checking is not practical (Nielsen, 2014), dedi-
cated simulators are preferred for robotics V&V. Unlike
formal methods, simulation-based testing is not exhaustive
and cannot offer proof of requirement satisfaction.
However, simulators allow more detailed modeling of the
physical and low-level implementation aspects (e.g., sen-
sors or joint controllers in the actuators), and the robot’s
actual control code can be executed for V&V purposes.
This is because simulators do not need to be exhaustive, so
computational resources can be used to model systems at a
lower level of abstraction than is seen in formal verifica-
tion. For example, a simulator was built in MATLAB by
Kirwan et al. (2013), whereas Arnold and Alexander
(2013) used the Player/Stage 2D simulator and Pinho et al.
(2014) used the SimTwo simulator, in combination with the
ROS robot software development framework, to test auton-
omous navigation control algorithms. Navigation algo-
rithms were also validated in simulation by Sotiropoulos
et al. (2017) by using MORSE, the Modular OpenRobots
Simulation Engine (LAAS CNRS, 2016). In our previous
work, we developed simulators in a 3D physical engine,
Gazebo, containing models of the robot’s joints and contin-
uous motion in space, along with its continuous environ-
ment containing objects and humans (Araiza-Illan et al.,
2015, 2016).
In other domains, such as microelectronics, both formal
methods and simulation-based testing are used, e.g., elec-
tronic design automation tools. Simulation and formal
methods have been used in combination to overcome the
limitations of model checking or to provide human-readable
evidence of failures that can be observed at runtime.
Emulating these principles, academic formal analysis tools
also offer both model checking and simulation-based test-
ing, such as UPPAAL (Nielsen, 2014), Event-B (Event-B,
2019), and the FDR4 tool (University of Oxford, 2012).
Nonetheless, performing both model checking and testing
over the same formal model is disadvantageous when gain-
ing confidence in the resulting V&V evidence, as these two
V&V techniques are subject to the same modeling and cod-
ing errors. This problem is highlighted by Kirwan et al.
(2013), as they crafted a simulator (in MATLAB) and a for-
mal model (in Promela for the SPIN model checker) of
their robot’s software (an autonomous navigation closed-
loop system) independently to overcome the limitations of
simulations and model checking and gain confidence in
their results. Intana et al. (2013) combined the advantages
of simulation and formal verification for wireless sensor
networks. Simulations in an environment called MiXiM
allowed functional issues to be discovered in a high-fidelity
model, whereas formal verification in Event-B was used to
provide proofs of requirement satisfaction or violation to
strengthen the discoveries during simulation. Intana et al.
(2013) do not consider a course of action if the results from
simulation contradict those from formal verification, as is
done in the corroborative V&V approach presented in this
paper.
Experiments in real-world scenarios are costly when
compared with simulation and formal methods and cannot
thoroughly explore the full state space of an HRI scenario.
Simulation and experimentation can be combined through
hybrids of human-in-the-loop and simulation or robot-in-
the-loop and simulation, as proposed by Petters et al.
(2008). However, corroborative V&V allows the use of a
number of techniques, e.g., formal methods, simulation-
based testing, and experiments, to verify and validate vari-
ous requirements, eliminating the need to choose between
examining the full state space of an HRI and modeling the
HRI in satisfactory detail.
Fig. 11. A more abstract view of corroborative V&V using
several V&V techniques.
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8.3. Model validation and meta-V&V
Our corroborative V&V approach draws on different forms
of evidence from various V&V techniques to support a
claim. In that sense, corroborative V&V can be seen as a
‘‘meta-level’’ approach to verification and validation, in
which V&V is achieved through a comparison between the
results of different V&V approaches.
The clear presentation of such arguments, e.g., by goal
structuring notation (Kelly and Weaver, 2004), is an impor-
tant consideration in safety-critical systems. Hawkins et al.
(2011) describe the importance of separating a safety argu-
ment from its accompanying confidence argument, which
justifies the sufficiency of confidence in the safety argu-
ment. Like our approach, but more limited in terms of vari-
ety of V&V techniques, the claims computed with a new
variant of formal analysis, based on models of flows
instead of models of states, are validated by experiments in
the laboratory (Lyons et al., 2013). Lyons et al. (2013)
applied the verification technique to autonomous naviga-
tion algorithms for multi-robot missions for Pioneer-3AT
robots, but their validation stage only involved one robot.
An approach to test robotic software through co-simulation
was presented by Broenink et al. (2010), who used formal
verification to find deadlocks through the FDR2 tool,
while models of the robot’s software and hardware at differ-
ent levels of abstraction allowed a thorough testing of the
discrete and continuous interacting components. These
multiple simulators run in a synchronized manner in a co-
simulation. They do not consider a course of action when
finding discrepancies between the formal analysis and the
simulations.
In corroborative V&V, we seek agreement between dif-
ferent V&V techniques with respect to particular set of
requirements. Discrepancies may arise as a result of inac-
curacies or errors in one or more of the system models,
requirements models, or tools used. In several previous
works, methods have been proposed for improving the
models. For example, formal models are refined iteratively
if they produce a spurious property violation after model
checking in counterexample-guided abstraction refinement
(CEGAR) (Clarke et al., 2000). An initial detailed model is
abstracted to form a simpler upper approximation for which
model checking is tractable. After encountering a violation
of a requirement, that model is iteratively and automatically
refined to determine whether the violation is spurious (i.e.,
does not occur in the more detailed model). The level of
detail that may be accounted for by such techniques
remains limited to that which can be formally modeled. For
a system’s software, this may extend to the concrete code
design, but for complex cyber-physical systems, such as
HRI, there will typically be important details that cannot be
adequately represented. Corroborative V&V may be seen
as an approach in the spirit of CEGAR, with greater depen-
dence on human judgment to extend beyond formal model-
ing and accommodate system models between which
absolute agreement might not be achievable.
Many approaches have been proposed to verify and vali-
date requirement models with respect to consistency, com-
pleteness, and precision. For example, Heitmeyer (2007)
developed a tool that performs formal verification (both
model checking and theorem proving) as well as simulation
and even code generation by integrating multiple external
tools. Nonetheless, further advantages can be gained when
different independently applied V&V techniques are com-
bined to gain confidence in the results, as we propose here.
Frameworks to verify and validate models for simulation
tasks with respect to accuracy and validity have been pro-
posed (Robinson, 1997; Sargent, 2013). These models are
developed by gathering real-world data, and their V&V
continues throughout its simulation use. Dimensions that
can be verified are: concept (aspects to be included in the
model, such as variables of importance), data (e.g., accu-
racy, format), timing, control, and information flows, and
even the code, against bugs. Techniques that can be applied
for V&V include animation, comparison against other mod-
els, and testing (e.g., stress, sensitivity, and historical data
comparison). Nonetheless, the authors do not prescribe a
methodology with associated tools to achieve model V&V.
For ROS-based systems, the accuracy of a formal model
with respect to the robot’s control code may be more rigor-
ously examined by standardizing the formal description of
common ROS components, e.g., using the ‘‘ROS graph’’
formalization developed by Aitken et al. (2014) to enable
automated reconfiguration of ROS systems. Recently, this
formalization has been adopted by Hazim et al. (2016) to
apply model checking to the verification of timing proper-
ties of ROS processes. This approach shows promise for
ensuring that the formal model is representative of the sys-
tem’s performance. Further work is needed to demonstrate
whether it can be usefully extended to capture inaccuracies
in modeling the environment or the requirements, which
may be more challenging to model when considering phys-
ical aspects of the system besides timing.
8.4. Automated software tools
For both requirement and system models, an approach to
ensuring consistency is to generate one model from another
using a trusted method. Automated tools can help in this
process, such as translations from MATLAB or Simulink
control models or control code into formal models for
model checking (Meenakshi et al., 2006; Xie et al., 2004).
Formal system models can be automatically extracted from
real code (Corbett et al., 2000; Gallardo et al., 2012;
Mukhopadhyay, 2015), although not many tools are com-
patible with Python, a popular language for prototyping
robotics code. Logical properties may be automatically
converted into automata (Gastin and Oddoux, 2001), which
may then be encoded as a monitor in the form of a finite-
state machine. Huang et al. (2014a) introduce rosmop, a
tool to automatically convert logical properties into moni-
tors for runtime verification of ROS code. Similar
approaches could be adopted in combination with
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corroborative V&V for HRI to increase the level of confi-
dence in the results, although errors could still propagate
when transforming one model into another, e.g., inaccura-
cies in a logical property will propagate to a monitor.
A simulation-based testing process can be improved by
using tests that not only stimulate the system but can also
find faults, using so-called mutation-based test generation
(Huang et al., 2014b). A system’s safety and liveness
requirements model, crucial in a V&V task, can also be
verified for consistency, correctness, and completeness,
e.g., using a combination of formal methods, static analy-
sis, and simulation, as in Heitmeyer (2007). If a system is
to be designed and implemented from a requirements
model, certified code generators (Naks et al., 2009) and
code synthesis (e.g., refinement) (Ringert et al., 2014) can
be employed. However, the validity of the resulting code is
dependent on the accurate representation of non-software
aspects of the system in the original model, which is espe-
cially challenging in the HRI domain. Furthermore, in
practice, robots are commonly designed and built by differ-
ent interacting teams, owing to the complexity of the
applications.
In summary, various techniques exist to promote correct-
ness in modeling and to bridge different levels of abstrac-
tion for V&V in robotics and other domains. However,
none of these spans the full range of realism and coverabil-
ity needed to thoroughly verify and validate an HRI system
while systematically addressing the possibility for errors to
be introduced at any level of abstraction. Confidence in the
results of these techniques, if used in isolation, is thus lim-
ited. Our proposed approach does not prescribe specific
V&V tools and techniques to be used. Automatic transla-
tion and connections between the used V&V techniques
can be added to the approach, with discretion, to improve
confidence or efficiency in the V&V exercise. For instance,
in our demonstration, we exploit model-based test genera-
tion and the ROS–Gazebo compatibility as additional links
between simulation-based testing and formal methods.
9. Conclusions
We presented corroborative V&V, a novel approach to the
verification and validation of robotic assistants, to help in
demonstrating their trustworthiness in the context of
human–robot interactions. There are a multitude of V&V
techniques, from formal methods like model checking, to
various kinds of simulation, hardware-in-the-loop, experi-
mentation, and real-world deployment. Naturally, there are
trade-offs between different V&V techniques, e.g., owing
to abstraction level, ease of modeling and coverability.
Furthermore, it is likely that different V&V techniques
may not initially agree on whether a particular system
meets a particular requirement. Corroborative V&V allows
us to use the different V&V techniques together, playing to
their individual strengths. Where discrepancies between
V&V techniques are found, corroborative V&V can be
used to ‘‘iron out’’ these differences, working toward a situ-
ation where the majority of the V&V techniques are in
agreement with respect to a particular set of requirements
for a given system.
Therefore, corroborative V&V provides integral assur-
ances on a robot’s safety and functional correctness through
the combination of a number of V&V techniques. The use
of these techniques provides corroboration at different
degrees of coverability (i.e., the exploration of the HRI
task) and HRI modeling expressivity, thus overcoming the
shortfalls of each technique when applied in isolation. For
example, model checking provides an exhaustive explora-
tion of a system model, but at the cost of system detail,
which is often lost in an abstract model. However, in
simulation-based testing, we gain high-fidelity detail by
running the real software, but we cannot test the whole
state space of variables and behaviors. Also, an iterative
process between the different V&V techniques can be used
if the resulting evidence presents discrepancies, refining
and improving the assets (i.e., system and requirement
models) to represent the HRI task in a more truthful man-
ner. This allows a greater level of confidence in the result-
ing evidence about the safety and functional correctness of
the robot.
We demonstrated our corroborative V&V approach
through a handover task, a safety-critical part of a complex
cooperative manufacture scenario, for which we proposed
safety and liveness requirements. We constructed formal
models (probabilistic timed automata), a simulator (in the
robot operating system and Gazebo), and a test rig for the
HRI (in the Bristol Robotics Laboratory), as well as tem-
poral logic properties and assertion checkers from the
requirements. The V&V focus starts with a pair of require-
ments, requirements 1a and 1b, for which we sought corro-
boration between the three techniques by modifying the
formal model and the simulator. We then examined a num-
ber of other requirements, finding previously unknown
functional failures in the system. Our results showcase the
benefits of our approach in terms of thorough exploration
of the system under V&V at different levels of detail and
completeness and in terms of gaining confidence in the
V&V results through corroboration.
9.1. Future work
We will investigate how the translational potential of our
proposed approach can be improved by more explicit eva-
luations of confidence. For example, Guiochet et al. (2015)
summarize various qualitative and quantitative approaches
to assessing confidence in V&V evidence. They present a
quantitative model describing the propagation of confi-
dence through particular argument structures. The results
of our demonstration of corroborative V&V constitute an
‘‘alternative argument’’ structure, in that separate pieces of
evidence can corroborate each other. Where one technique
provides limited assurance—e.g., testing covers a limited
state space of a higher-fidelity model while model checking
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covers the full state space of a lower-fidelity model—this
may be accounted for by applying weighting factors to indi-
vidual pieces of evidence provided by each technique. For
probabilistic traits of a system, statistical techniques, such
as the modified Wald method (Agresti and Coull, 1998),
can be used to quantify the uncertainty (confidence inter-
vals) arising from the limited number of tests feasible in
simulation or experiment. However, it should be noted that
such confidence intervals do not describe the accuracy of
the models themselves. Hence, the implementation of quan-
titative models of confidence propagation will often rely on
informal estimates of the confidence in individual pieces of
evidence.
Finally, we intend to apply corroborative V&V to a
broader collaborative manufacturing task, of which hand-
over may be a subcomponent.
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Appendix: Index to multimedia extensions
Archives of IJRR multimedia extensions published prior to
2014 can be found at http://www.ijrr.org, after 2014 all
videos are available on the IJRR YouTube channel at http://
www.youtube.com/user/ijrrmultimedia
Table of multimedia extensions.
Extension Media type Description
1 Video BERT 2 handover
experimental test rig
2 Video BERT 2 ROS–Gazebo simulation
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